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SEC ENFORCEMENT TECHNIQUES: EXPANDING
AND EXOTIC FORMS OF ANCILLARY RELIEF
JAMEs C. TREADWAY, JR.*
The enforcement process of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion has a widespread impact upon the corporate and financial world.
It is generally recognized that the Commission has extensive regula-
tory powers over certain members of the financial community, such
as broker-dealers, securities exchanges and registered investment
companies. However, through its enforcement procedures, the SEC
has begun to exert increasing control over ordinary commercial and
industrial companies, accounting firms, and even law firms. This new
and expanded control over such entities is not confined to transac-
tions universally accepted as subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC,
such as raising funds by selling stock to the public. The immediate
past has seen the Commission use enforcement cases as a means of
exacting substantial concessions from alleged violators of the federal
securities laws, often resulting in direct SEC involvement in the in-
ternal affairs of the alleged violator.
In recent enforcement cases, the SEC has obtained the appoint-
ments of a receiver displacing incumbent management' and of special
receivers or masters to make public disclosure and reports of corpo-
rate transactions and affairs.2 The Commission has also obtained
substantial changes in the make-up of a board of directors which
effectively deprived the alleged violators of their dominant control of
the corporation 3 and similar restructurings of executive committees.4
Other SEC involvement in internal corporate affairs includes "bar-
gaining" for concessions pursuant to which management agrees to
retain special counsel to advise it with respect to its obligations under
*Member of the firm of Dickstein, Shapiro & Morin, Washington, D.C. A.B.
(1964), University of Georgia; L.L.B. (1967), Washington & Lee University.
'E.g., SEC v. U.S. Tank Car Corp., SEC Litigation Release Nos. 6512 (Sept. 11,
1974), 6520 (Sept. 17, 1974) and 6573 (Nov. 4, 1974), SEC v. Arata, SEC Litigation
Release No. 6180 (Dec. 27, 1973). The SEC attempted but failed to obtain similar relief
in SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Distrib., Ltd., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,980 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 11, 1975), and SEC v. Clinton Oil Co., Civil Action No. W-5020 (D. Kan. Jan.
15, 1973).
'SEC v. Koenig, 469 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1972).
'SEC v. Mattel, Inc., SEC Litigation Release Nos. 6531 (Oct. 2, 1974) and 6467
(Aug. 8, 1974).
'SEC v. Mattel, Inc., SEC Litigation Release No. 6531 (Oct. 2, 1974); SEC v.
Great Coastal Gas Corp., SEC Litigation Release No. 6054 (Sept. 12, 1973).
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the federal securities laws,5 and the institution of internal corporate
procedures and controls to prevent future violations of the securities
laws.'
Industrial corporations and their managements have not been the
only ones to fall subject to such unusual sanctions in the context of
enforcement cases. Under pressure from the SEC, a major accounting
firm has agreed to submit to a review of its internal procedures by
fellow accountants,7 another accounting firm has agreed to send one
of its partners to a refresher course,8 and a law firm has agreed to
adopt certain internal controls and to embark upon a continuing
education program for certain of its members.'
All of these developments have occurred in the context of enforce-
ment cases brought by the SEC under the Securities Act of 193311 and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,11 both of which are denominated
as disclosure laws by their preambles. In addition, these acts are
quite specific in granting the SEC its general powers to take action
against violators, primarily the power to seek injunctions against
violations. Section 20(b) of the 1933 Act12 and § 21(e) of the 1934 Act 3
contain virtually identical language, which provides in pertinent
part:
Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person
is engaged or about to engage in any acts or practices which
constitute or will constitute a violation of the provisions of this
title, or of any rule or regulation. . . , it may in its discretion,
bring an action . . . to enjoin such acts or practices .... 11-1
'SEC v. Great Coastal Gas Corp., SEC Litigation Release No. 6054 (Sept. 12,
1973).
6SEC v. Canadian Javelin, Ltd., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11172 (Jan.
9, 1975); SEC v. Allegheny Beverage Corp., SEC Litigation Release No. 6670 (Jan. 8,
1975); SEC v. Mattel, Inc., SEC Litigation Release Nos. 6531 (Oct. 2, 1974) and 6467
(Aug. 8, 1974); SEC v. Sunshine Mining Co., SEC Litigation Release No. 6544 (Oct.
11, 1974).
7In re Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, Securities Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 10172 (May 23, 1973). See also In re Touche Ross & Co., Securities Act
Release No. 5459 (Feb. 25, 1974).
sIn re Benjamin Botwinick & Co., Adm. Proc. File No. 3-3518 (Jan. 15, 1975).
'In re Jo M. Ferguson, Securities Act Release No. 5523 (Aug. 21, 1974). See also
SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973). Cf. SEC v. National Student
Marketing Corp., 360 F. Supp. 284 (D.D.C. 1973).
1r15 U.S.C. § 77a, et. seq. (1970).
"15 U.S.C. § 78a, et. seq. (1970).
1215 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1970).
"315 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1970).
"-'Emphasis added.
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Despite this seemingly uncomplicated and straightforward lan-
guage, in enforcement cases the SEC has increasingly obtained the
forms of relief enumerated above, in addition to the statutory injunc-
tion against future violations. Such exotic relief is generally referred
to as ancillary relief, and there is ample precedent for ancillary relief
in injunctive proceedings, dating back to some of the earliest cases
decided under these acts. 4 When decreed by a federal court, such
relief has been granted on the theory that the court has broad discre-
tion in fashioning remedies for securities law violations since it sits
as a traditional court of equity.
This article does not purport to examine the general equity power
of the federal courts; rather, it focuses upon recent enforcement cases
which involve exotic and novel forms of ancillary relief with poten-
tially far-reaching consequences for generally unregulated entities. In
so doing, some conclusions are drawn as to the basis upon which the
SEC determines that it will seek ancillary relief, whether the forms
of ancillary relief in the cases are consistent with the disclosure phi-
losophy of the 1933 and 1934 Acts, and whether as a policy matter
the SEC should be so involved in the internal affairs of corporations,
accounting firms, and law firms.
It is important to remember that virtually all of the enforcement
cases discussed herein were settled by mutual consent, generally
without any admission or denial of violations,15 and were not litigated
on the merits. As a result, the decrees emanating from them are
"E.g., Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282 (1940); Kardon v.
National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
15As a procedural matter, the method of settling cases in this fashion involves the
execution of a "Stipulation and Consent to Final Judgment of Permanent Injunction"
by the SEC and the defendant. This is then presented to the court, which enters the
agreed-upon injunction based upon the Stipulation and Consent. The language which
is critical in making it clear that there is no finding of a violation of law generally reads
as follows:
This Stipulation and Consent is entered into solely for the purpose of
settlement of this action, without trial or argument of any issue of fact
or law. Neither this Stipulation and Consent, nor the entry of judg-
ment herein in accordance with the Final Judgment of Permanent
Injunction in the form annexed hereto, shall constitute any evidence
or any admission or any adjudication with respect to any allegation
of the Commission's complaint or any fact or conclusion of law with
respect to any matter alleged in or arising out of the Commission's
complaint, or of any wrong-doing or misconduct on the part of defen-
dant XYZ or any of its officers, agents, servants, employees, succes-
sors, assigns, or any person or persons acting in concert or participa-
tion with it.
1975]
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without broad judicial approval. Nevertheless, it is important to at-
tempt to assess the potential consequences of the trend represented
by these decrees.
It must be emphasized, however, that the discussion of these cases
is in no way intended as any conclusion or implication that violations
of the law in fact occurred or that any defendant or person associated
with any defendant was engaged in any illegal, improper, or unethical
activity.
I. Limited Receiver for Disclosure Purposes
One of the more important recent cases dealing with ancillary
relief in SEC enforcement cases, in part because it is one of the few
cases litigated and decided on the merits, is SEC v. Koenig."8 In
Koenig, the SEC commenced two enforcement actions against a
publicly-held corporation and its president within a relatively short
period of time. Both actions were based principally upon alleged
violations of § 10(b)"7 of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5,18 generally
arising out of allegedly misleading or inaccurate press releases and
failures to make public disclosure of the true state of various corpo-
rate affairs and transactions.
In the first case, the SEC sought the standard injunction against
future violations of the securities laws. This case was settled by con-
sent without any admission of violation by the defendants. In the
second case, however, the SEC also sought the appointment of a
"limited receiver" with the power to investigate the affairs of the
corporation and to make timely and accurate reports of the state of
its affairs to the SEC, to its stockholders and to the general public.
Despite the defendants' contentions to the contrary, the Second Cir-
cuit ruled that courts could appoint such limited receivers and that
such relief was appropriate in light of the nature of the alleged courses
of conduct of the defendants.
In so ruling, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court 9 which
had ruled in favor of the limited receiver sought by the SEC. The
district court had given cogent and explicit reasons for its decision.
The court emphasized that the defendants had engaged in a "com-
plex set of secret securities transactions"'" which had the effect of
leaving the court in the position of being unable to determine the
6469 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1972).
715 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
117 C.F.R. § 240.1ob-5 (1974).
1[1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,536 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
'Id. at 92,561.
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nature and extent of the injury to stockholders. The court therefore
considered the limited receiver "necessary to preserve the status quo
while an accurate picture of what transpired is obtained."'" It then
proceeded to enumerate the sins of the defendants: "misleading and
late reports to the SEC," "incomplete press reports to the public,"
the secret transfer of "voting control of valuable European subsidiar-
ies" to the individual defendants, and the frustration of "all attempts
of dissident shareholders to change the present management. ' 2 Hav-
ing made these findings, the court formulated the following decree
and ancillary relief:
In view of these past activities, the Court concludes that it
cannot rely on the defendants to implement the directions of
the Court. ... A receiver therefore will be appointed and will
be directed to (1) investigate the recapitalization of the Euro-
pean subsidiaries of ECO; (2) make full, complete and accur-
ate public disclosure of all material events and facts concern-
ing the defendants, their officers, agent, servants, employees,
directors, subsidiaries and affiliates; (3) make timely and ac-
curate filing of reports with the SEC in conformity with Sec-
tion 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act and the Rules pro-
mulgated thereunder and to make those amended filings nec-
essary to correct those reports presently filed; (4) issue a report
to ECO stockholders for the years 1970 and 1971; (5) hold a
1972 annual ECO stockholders' meeting and (6) make ECO's
books and records and stockholder list available to any ECO
stockholder who is legally entitled to access to these docu-
ments.2
The receiver appointed by the court was former New York Mayor
Robert Wagner, who conducted his investigation and prepared his
report much in the capacity of an "independent legal auditor."
Thereafter, he distributed a thirty-five page report which detailed
various transactions which the SEC had alleged to involve violations
of the securities laws. The report concluded that certain explanations
of officers and directors as to why the transactions occurred were
"illogical and therefore incredible, '2 4 and drew conclusions as to




2 Report submitted by Robert F. Wagner, Receiver, Pursuant to Order of United
States District Court, Southern District Of New York, 1973, p. 5.
1975]
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the benefit of stockholders or whether, to the contrary, they lacked
any legitimate corporate purpose. The report was highly critical of
management, concluded that management had released false finan-
cial information to the public,and generally took a dim view of vir-
tually all the corporate actions attacked by the SEC in its complaint.
As previously noted, part of the significance of this case is that it
is one of the few cases involving such extraordinary relief which was
litigated rather than settled by consent. Another important aspect is
that the ancillary relief was limited to the concept of disclosure, the
basic philosophy of the 1933 and 1934 Acts. The court specifically
referred to the receiver as a "limited receiver," and his powers were
confined to conducting an investigation and making public disclosure
of the results of his investigation.
In light of the egregious nature of the violations alleged and found
by the court, this case should be considered for comparison purposes
when evaluating subsequent enforcement actions brought by the SEC
in which the relief sought is much broader, even though the alleged
violations appear no more extreme. Such a comparison prompts one
to speculate whether the Koenig2 decision was the beginning of a now
pronounced trend, as a range of later enforcement actions seem to
indicate. Of course, one can only speculate as to the thought pro-
cesses of the SEC, but subsequent cases seem to indicate that this
may be so.
II. The Outright Receiver- A Bargaining Tool and an End In Itself
In some instances the SEC apparently has concluded that the
type or extent of alleged violations of the securities laws are such that
ancillary relief which goes well beyond disclosure is warranted. A
significant example of such a case is SEC v. Clinton Oil Co., 2 1 which
a former SEC Commissioner has cited as an example of "more com-
prehensive and effective relief' in the enforcement area. 27
Clinton Oil was one of the glamour companies of the 1960's and
the early 1970's, attracting widespread investor interest. The com-
pany was engaged in oil and gas exploration, principally financed by
the public sale of limited partnership interests in oil and gas drilling
funds.2 The common stock of the company was also publicly traded.
23a69 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1972).
"'Civil Action No. W-5020 (D. Kan. Jan. 15, 1973).
'Speech of Former SEC Commissioner Hugh Owens before the North American
Securities Administrators, September 1973.
2The interests in these limited partnerships were the subject of registration state-
ments filed under the Securities Act of 1933.
SEC ENFORCEMENT TECHNIQUES
Clinton Oil reached its zenith when it sold its 1969 drilling program
to the public for $100,000,000, the largest oil and gas program ever
sold. Yet, according to the SEC's complaint, all was not well with
Clinton Oil, and had not been well for many years. Among other
things, contrary to Clinton's announcement, the spectacular 1969
program was not fully sold to the public. Instead, approximately
$30,000,000 of the sales were on credit, meaning that Clinton Oil had
received no cash for these sales. Furthermore, for a substantial period
of time Clinton and its insiders had received interests in various
drilling programs on credit, subsequently exchanging those interests
for stock in the company, and finally selling the stock to pay the
indebtedness. In addition, sales of Clinton common stock by insiders,
were carefully orchestrated to avoid depressing the market price of
the common stock, and the company was also making loans to insi-
ders to buy Clinton stock in the open-market to bolster the price of
the stock. None of this was disclosed to the SEC or to public inves-
tors.
To remedy this situation, the SEC's complaint included a prayer
for:
An order appointing a receiver to take control of all of the
business of defendant Clinton Oil Company and authorizing,
empowering and directing such receiver to take charge thereof
to conduct the same until order of the court; and to require
said receiver to obtain an accounting of all disbursements by
Clinton Oil Company to each defendant named herein for the
period January 26, 1966, to the effective date of said receiver-
ship."
While the goal of the SEC in this case may have been admirable -
and certainly the alleged fraud was massive and blatant - it should
be noted that the relief requested went well beyond the concept of
disclosure. Indeed, one of the SEC's other prayers was for an order
that Clinton Oil amend all previously filed reports with the SEC to
correct alleged disclosure deficiencies." Thus, supplementing the re-
lief relating to disclosure, the additional relief sought by the SEC
would have had the effect of ousting incumbent management and
transferring total control over the company to a court-appointed re-
ceiver.
Although the receiver the SEC sought was not appointed, Clinton
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Oil was settled by a consent decree which indirectly involved the
same result. The defendants consented to a court-supervised change
in management in which the principal perpetrators of the alleged
scheme were removed and new, independent management was
brought in to try to maintain Clinton Oil as a viable corporation.
Consequently, even though the SEC did not obtain the appoint-
ment of a receiver, the mere existence of the prayer for appointment
proved a powerful bargaining tool. The only way incumbent manage-
ment could have avoided the appointment of a receiver and remained
in control of the company was by a long trial which in all probability
would have involved at least one appeal. The expense would have
been enormous, the pressure incalculable, and the exposure in com-
panion private civil actions staggering if the case had been lost. Ac-
cordingly, the defendants apparently concluded that discretion was
the better part of valor and yielded to a settlement which involved
no admission of violation.
The progression from Koenig to Clinton Oil is worth remember-
ing. In Koenig, which was decided approximately 18 months before
Clinton Oil, the SEC's prayers for relief were tied strictly to disclo-
sure. In Clinton Oil, the relief originally sought covered the whole
gamut of disclosure and also sought to effect a change in manage-
ment. Thus, within a relatively short period of time, the SEC prog-
ressed to the point of evaluating the fitness of a corporation's man-
agement and, upon concluding that it was unfit to run a public com-
pany, seeking its ouster. The progeny of Koenig and Clinton Oil serve
to demonstrate how rapidly this trend has accelerated.
SEC v. U.S. Tank Car Corp.3 is a recent case which illustrates
this trend. The defendants in U.S. Tank Car allegedly sold various
unregistered securities in the form of interests in railroad tank cars
and an accompanying management program for the cars. According
to the SEC's complaint, in excess of $9 million in proceeds which were
received from various investors from August 31, 1973, until June 30,
1974, were not used to purchase tank cars. Of this amount, only
$878,300 was paid to tank car manufacturers. The defendants alleg-
edly diverted the balance of the proceeds to their personal use, while
providing fraudulent certificates of ownership to investors. The SEC
sought the standard preliminary and permanent injunctions, as well
as appointment of a receiver. After a hearing, the Court entered a
temporary restraining order and appointed an attorney as a receiver
31SEC Litigation Release Nos. 6512 (Sept. 11, 1974), 6520 (Sept. 17, 1974), and
6573 (Nov. 4, 1974).
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of the corporation.2
In assessing the apparent reasons for the prayer for a receiver in
light of Koenig and Clinton Oil, it should be noted that U.S. Tank
Car involved alleged fraud in the form of outright theft of investors'
funds. In light of such blatant violations, the SEC obviously felt that
the traditional injunction or remedies confined to disclosure were
insufficient under the circumstances. Apparently, in this case the
SEC viewed diversion or theft of investors' funds as grounds for seek-
ing extraordinary forms of relief, including a receiver. From a purely
visceral level of justice and equity, it is easy to applaud the SEC's
efforts in a case such as U.S. Tank Car. If the SEC's allegations in
such cases turn out to be true, massive and blatant violations of the
securities laws will have occurred and defendants will have demon-
strated a patent unwillingness to comply with the law. In U.S. Tank
Car, it appears that the egregious nature of the violations, coupled
with the element of diversion of investors' funds, prompted the SEC
to seek the extraordinary relief involved.
SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Ltd. 3 is an example of another case
wherein diversion or potential diversion of investors' funds was in-
volved and the SEC sought broad ancillary relief, including the ap-
pointment of a receiver. The SEC alleged that the various Brigadoon
defendants were offering for public sale without compliance with the
registration requirements of the 1933 Act certain unregistered securi-
ties, namely investment contracts in the form of interests in scotch
whiskey and in rare coin portfolios.3 4 The SEC also alleged various
violations of the anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws.35 In addi-
tion to the usual injunctive relief, the SEC sought the disgorgement
by all defendants of all proceeds received in connection with their
sales of unregistered securities and the appointment of a receiver of
the assets and property of the defendants to, among other things,
assist investors in obtaining the return of their investments and to
distribute to investors the proceeds disgorged by the defendants. The
SEC also sought an order freezing the assets of the defendants pend-
ing the disposition of its request for this ancillary relief, as well as an
order staying and restraining all creditors of the defendants.
On February 11, 1975, a hearing was held before the court on the
SEC's motion for a preliminary injunction.35 The court first ruled that
"SEC Litigation Release No. 6520 (Sept. 17, 1974).
"SEC Litigation Release No. 6640 (Dec. 12, 1974).
'Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970).
"Securities Act of 1933 § 17(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970); Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) (1970).
"SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Distrib., Inc., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,980
1975]
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the rare coin portfolios which were offered and sold by Brigadoon
involved a "security" within the meaning of § 2(1) of the 1933 Act.
Having made that determination, the court granted the Commis-
sion's motion for a preliminary injunction. However, the court did not
see fit to grant the application for ancillary relief:
The application for the appointment of a receiver is denied. No
showing has been made that such a drastic remedy is necessary
for the protection of the public. Indeed, it appears that the
expense which a receivership would involve would not only
impose an undue burden on the defendants but could jeopard-
ize the interests of the public as well.
3
1
The foregoing is the only explanation given by the court as a basis
for its decision not to grant the SEC's prayers for ancillary relief.
Notwithstanding the court's ruling, some valuable insight into the
SEC's philosophy can be drawn from the prayers for relief when
viewed against a background of the alleged violations. Prayers for
receivers, disgorgement and the freezing of assets are forms of relief
designed principally to assure that investors' funds are preserved
intact and not wrongly diverted. In these respects, Brigadoon bears
a distinct similarity to U.S. Tank Car, although in Brigadoon actual
diversion of investors' funds was not alleged. According to the SEC,
the ancillary relief requested would have enabled all interested par-
ties to obtain a judicial determination of their respective rights.
Since the SEC is admittedly attempting to protect the interests
of all parties, even creditors, the Brigadoon approach to enforcement
cases deserves substantial reflection. While the goal of protecting all
interests may be admirable from a social policy standpoint, the fact
remains that the relief the SEC sought but was denied is quite far-
reaching and that protecting non-security holders lies outside the
Congressional mandate given the SEC by the '33 and '34 acts. Unfor-
tunately, the court did not focus extensively on the ancillary relief
question and therefore little insight into judicial attitudes on the
issue can be gleaned from this case.
III. Ponzi and Pyramid Schemes
Thus far, the cases examined have allegedly involved instances of
egregious violations, and in many cases the misappropriation of
investors' funds, indicating that blatant violations coupled with di-
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 1975).
3id. at 97,388.
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version of funds appear to be the basis for the SEC's actions. This
conclusion is supported by actions in another area in which the SEC
has begun to seek broad ancillary relief, usually a receiver. These
cases involve pyramid schemes and the so-called "Ponzi" schemes.38
A pyramid scheme39 essentially involves a process whereby indi-
viduals invest a sum of money and in return obtain the right to
receive compensation based upon the number of other individuals
they can recruit to participate in the scheme. Individuals brought
into the scheme are recruited on the same basis and a pyramid effect
occurs. Ultimately, arithmetic controls and those at the bottom of the
pyramid suffer losses since they are left with no one to recruit. Gener-
ally, pyramid schemes are tied to the sale of a product which is to be
resold down the pyramid. Cosmetics, cookware, and franchises or
dealerships provide recent examples. Regardless of the product in-
volved, the viability of such schemes depends upon the enrollment
of a geometrically increasing number of participants and collapse is
inevitable.
Some schemes of recent vintage have involved substantial sums
of money, running into hundreds of millions of dollars.,' In light of
the magnitude of the sums involved, and having generally convinced
the courts that interests in such schemes fall within the statutory
definition of a "security,"4 the SEC has begun to act vigorously,
routinely seeking to close down such operations by obtaining the
appointment of a receiver.
Examples of such enforcement actions cover a variety of cases,
many relatively unpublicized, which generally are settled by consent.
One such example is SEC v. Arata.42 In Arata, the defendant com-
"'Named for Charles Ponzi, a Boston swindler who devised the original scheme in
the early 1900's. His scheme involved postal money orders, which he represented he
was purchasing with the investors' funds. Instead, funds from new investors were used
to repay old investors and additional investors were constantly recruited.
"Legislation was introduced by Senator Mondale in the 93rd Congress which
would have outlawed pyramid schemes without regard to whether such schemes in-
volve the sale of unregistered securities. Other than a hearing, no action was taken on
the bill. (S. 1939, introduced June 4, 1973; hearing on July 10, 1974).
"Former SEC Commissioner Hugh Owens has estimated that pyramid schemes
resulted in investors' losses exceeding $1 billion. (Speech before North American Se-
curities Administrators, September 1973).
4The SEC has generally argued that the interest purchased by the investor is
either a "certificate of interest or participation in a profit-sharing agreement" or an
"investment contract," both of which are included in the definition of "security" in §
2(3) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1970). A series of recent cases has
supported the SEC's views. See, e.g., SEC v. Glenn Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d
476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
"SEC Litigation Release No. 6180 (Dec. 27, 1973).
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pany received public funds which purportedly were being used to
speculate in the commodities market. Public investors were to share
in the profits of the speculation, which were to come from the com-
modities trading skills of the principals of the defendant. The issuer
allegedly provided investors with false reports of huge profits, which
enabled the defendant to obtain additional public funds. According
to the SEC's complaint, the defendants' commodity speculations
were highly unsuccessful and most of the sums paid to investors as
their share of profits in fact came from money obtained from new.
investors. In short, the operation actually represented a classic Ponzi
scheme. It required the constant infusion of new funds from new
participants. The "new" participants in turn were repaid with funds
obtained from subsequent, newer participants.
In its complaint, the SEC requested the appointment of a receiver
in addition to the usual injunctions. The defendants consented to the
requested relief without admitting or denying any violations. The
Arata case is one wherein it is relatively easy to divine the reasons
behind the SEC's prayers for relief. The existence of the Ponzi
scheme and the diversion of assets clearly were the reasons which led
the SEC to conclude that a receiver to freeze the situation and to
allocate funds among the defrauded parties was the only effective
way to remedy the violations.
In December of 1974, a new medium was legalized for public in-
vestment - gold. For a time prior to legalization, anticipation of this
change and the concomitant steadily increasing price of gold on the
international market led many promoters to devise plans which capi-
talized on gold and silver fever. In most instances, the public inves-
tors who put money into these ventures did so on a highly leveraged
basis, planning to reap vast profits as the price of precious metals
spiralled higher and higher.
These ventures did not escape the attention of the SEC. In De-
cember 1974, the SEC filed an action against the Pacific Coast Coin
Exchange, 3 the nation's largest seller of margin contracts in gold and
silver coins. The SEC alleged fraud in connection with the sale of coin
contracts, charging that the defendants had sold $1 billion of these
contracts to approximately 25,000 people since 1970. The SEC's com-
plaint alleged that the sales were in violation of the registration re-
quirements of the 1933 Act44 and the various anti-fraud provisions of
both the 1933 and 1934 Acts.45 The critical substantive issue was
"SEC v. Monex Int'l, Ltd., SEC Litigation Release No. 6638 (Dec. 12, 1974).
"Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970).
"Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. 77 (e) (1970); Securities Exchange Act
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whether the sale of the margin contracts involved the sale of a "secu-
rity."46 In addition to the prayer for the usual injunctions, the SEC
requested that a receiver be appointed to take control of the defen-
dant company and its assets.
In its complaint, the SEC alleged that the $1 billion in sales
generated by the Exchange resulted from a "nationwide, polished,
hard sell, fraudulent promotional and marketing campaign. . .. "I'
The Commission charged that the operation was replete with fraudu-
lent misrepresentations and material omissions, that the defendants
levied exorbitant charges for services never performed, that the de-
fendants arbitrarily fixed silver prices to maximize the Exchange's
profits at the expense of investors, and that the defendants employed
scare tactics to pressure investors into unwisely large margined in-
vestments in coin contracts. The SEC further charged that the defen-
dants failed to disclose to the investors that they were using their
funds to acquire a jet airplane, a cattle operation and a gold mine,
and that substantial personal loans were made to Exchange officers
and their associates from investors' funds. The SEC also alleged that
about 75% of the customers' positions were covered by hedging in the
futures market in silver bullion and not by silver coins stored in
depositories as the defendants had represented, and that the Ex-
change did not own any depositories, although a list of depositories
appear in the Exchange's advertisements.
The SEC's complaint stopped short of alleging the existence of a
Ponzi scheme, but a between-the-lines reading of the allegations in-
dicates that a Ponzi probably existed. A continually expanding base
of investors was involved, funds were diverted, and whatever "prof-
its" were returned to investors apparently came from new investors'
infusions of cash.
The Ponzi scheme element was clearly present in similar cases
brought by the SEC, such as SEC v. Western Pacific Gold & Silver
Exchange Corp.48 In this case, the SEC charged that the defendants
sold unregistered securities49 in the form of investment interests in
gold coin and silver, which were represented by written agreements.
of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970).
"The SEC's theory appears to be that the commingling of investors' funds and
reliance by the investor upon the Exchange in anticipation of a profit were sufficient
to create a security in the form of an "investment contract." See, e.g., SEC v. W.J.
Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 588
(N.D. Ga. 1973) for an analysis of the concept of an investment contract.
"SEC Litigation Release No. 6638.
"SEC Litigation Release No. 6616 (Dec. 3, 1974).
"In violation of § 5 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970).
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In addition, the Commission alleged violations of the anti-fraud pro-
visions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts" by virtue of material misrepresen-
tation and omissions in connection with the sale of these interests.
Specifically, the SEC charged that the defendant corporation was
insolvent, that the investors' funds were not used to acquire silver and
gold coins but were converted to the defendants' use, and that the
method of operation of the defendants involved repaying existing
investors by raising money from other investors. In summary, the
SEC alleged that the operation was both a Ponzi scheme and outright
thievery.
The Commission sought the standard injunction against future
violations of the registration and anti-fraud provisions. It also re-
quested ancillary relief in the form of:
[A]n order restraining and enjoining the defendants from al-
tering, destroying, concealing, disposing, dissipating, or re-
moving any books, records, documents, correspondence, funds,
or assets . . . , an order appointing a receiver of all assets and
property of the defendants. . . , an order requiring the defen-
dants to provide the court with an accounting . . . , and an
order requiring the defendants to disgorge any and all funds or
silver which they have received .... 51
On January 30, 1975, the court entered a preliminary injunction
order against the defendant, which prohibited violation of the regis-
tration and anti-fraud provisions of the '33 and '34 Acts. The order
further granted the ancillary relief requested by the SEC, including
the appointment of a receiver. In addition, the court determined that
the interests sold by the defendants involved "securities" within the
statutory definition of that term.5"
In a series of similar cases involving gold and silver investments,
the SEC has also sought extreme ancillary relief.53 As with Western
Pacific, these cases all involved elements of a Ponzi scheme, diversion
or conversion of assets, and alleged misrepresentations.
A final case for consideration involves a pyramid scheme. In SEC
"Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970); Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1970).
"SEC Litigation Release No. 6616 (Dec. 3, 1974).
51SEC Litigation Release No. 6726, Civil Action No. LV-74-188 RDF (D.C. Nev.
Feb. 11, 1975).
"SEC v. Silver Mint Mortgage Co., Ltd., SEC Litigation Release No. 6585 (Nov.
14, 1974); SEC v. Constitution Mint, Inc., SEC Litigation Release No. 6586 (Nov. 14,
1974); SEC v. Continental Silver Corp. of Nevada, SEC Litigation Release No. 6604
(Nov. 14, 1974).
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v. Futuristic Foods, Inc.,51 the Commission alleged that defendants
were "operating a pyramid promotional scheme whereby persons who
invest substantial sums of money to purchase interests or participa-
tions in Futuristic Foods, Inc., will then attempt to locate other pro-
spective investors for the defendants to recruit."55 Charging violations
of the registration provisions of the 1933 Act and of the anti-fraud
provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts, the Commission requested the
standard injunctions along with the following ancillary relief:
[T]he appointment of a receiver to marshall and collect all
the assets of Futuristic Foods, Inc. in order to prevent waste
and dissipation of corporate assets; that an accounting be per-
formed; and that rescission offers be made to all persons who
invested in the Futuristic Foods, Inc. promotional scheme. The
Securities and Exchange Commission has alleged that monies
of approximately $1,000,000 have been obtained by the defen-
dants illegally since January, 1973, to date."
The common thread which emerges from the Commission's re-
quests for relief in these cases is that the SEC has not hesitated to
use its enforcement powers in attempting to obtain far more than the
statutory injunctions against Ponzi and pyramid schemes. Compa-
nies have been closed down and the SEC has assumed virtually total
control over the operations of some defendant corporations. Thus, the
Ponzi and pyramid schemes emerge as the types of violations which
the SEC will uniformly seek to remedy by broad forms of ancillary
relief, generally including a receiver. The Commission's rationale
appears to be that the continued operation of such schemes will by
their very nature result in more violations as later levels of partici-
pants are brought into the operations. This factor, plus the absence
of any economic substance to the schemes, emerges as the basis for
the SEC's apparent conclusion that relief confined to disclosure is
inadequate.
IV. Internal Corporate Procedures As a Form of Ancillary Relief
Ponzi and pyramid schemes are sensational merely by virtue of
their blatant nature and the sometimes staggering sums of money
involved. Consequently, such operations and the resulting SEC en-
forcement cases seem to lack any logical relationship to the tradi-
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tional corporate enterprise. Yet, there is a distinct connection in light
of the recent remedies sought by the Commission in both areas.
Recent cases against traditional corporations have involved the
appointment of special auditors or masters to investigate the affairs
of the allegedly offending company and to make public reports of the
results of the investigation. They have also resulted in the appoint-
ment of special counsel to do the same, the addition of new outside
directors, and orders that the offending corporation adopt certain
internal controls or procedures to prevent future violations. In each
instance, the result is the imposition of a quasi-governmental layer
of authority which deprives incumbent management of its absolute
control over the internal affairs of the corporation, although perhaps
not totally displacing incumbent management with a court-
appointed receiver as has frequently occurred in the Ponzi cases. Yet,
the logic behind the relief sought in the Ponzi cases and some of those
discussed below is essentially the same; i.e., that mere injunctions
against future violations are inadequate and that existing manage-
ment must be replaced or restructured to prevent recurrences of the
alleged violations.
One of the more informative cases involving internal corporate
restructuring as the result of an enforcement action is SEC v. Mattel,
Inc.,57 which was settled in October, 1974. The case actually involved
an original consent order and a subsequent amendment to the origi-
nal decree. The original consent decree settled an SEC case alleging
that Mattel, a financially troubled toy maker, misrepresented a pro-
jected fiscal 1973 profit when it had reason to know that it would have
a $32 million loss for 1973. In addition to the standard anti-fraud
injunctions, the original order required Mattel to name two unaffi-
liated directors and to establish two committees, a Financial Controls
and Audit Committee and a Litigation and Claims Committee. The
first committee was to institute internal procedures to assure that
recurrences of the defective financial reporting violations did not
occur. The second committee was to investigate whether and upon
what basis Mattel might have claims against its present or past offi-
cers and directors arising out of violations by them of the federal
securities laws.
The amended order was entered as the result of additional infor-
mation subsequently disclosed by Mattel to the SEC. This informa-
tion indicated that Mattel may have overstated its 1971 pre-tax in-
57SEC Litigation Release No. 6531 (Oct. 2, 1974); SEC Litigation Release No. 6467
(Aug. 8, 1974).
SEC ENFORCEMENT TECHNIQUES
come by as much as $10.5 million, as well as overstating its revenues
for.its second and third quarters of fiscal 1972 by $6.8 million. Under
the amended decree, Mattel was required to take the following fur-
ther action:
(i) appoint and maintain a Board of Directors, a majority of
which should be unaffiliated with Mattel, satisfactory to the
Commission and approved by the Court,
(ii) maintain a majority of the new unaffiliated directors on its
Executive Committee;
(iii) amend its filings with the Commission...
(iv) a majority of the new unaffiliated directors to appoint a
Special Counsel, satisfactory to the Commission and approved
by the Court, to investigate matters raised in the Commis-
sion's complaint . . . ; to file a report with the Court of his
findings and recommendations, and as approved by the new
directors, institute actions on behalf of the Company against
past or present officers, directors, and others; and,
(v) the Special Counsel to retain a Special Auditor satisfactory
to the Commission, the Court and Mattel, to audit the 1971
and 1972 financial statements and other statements as re-
quested, and to file within four months a report of his findings
with the Court and the Commission."
In addition, Mattel publicly announced that during its negotiations
with the SEC relating to the settlement it had agreed to eliminate
the position of chairman, which was held jointly by the company's
cofounders, who would, however, continue as directors.
Although Mattel neither admitted or denied the accuracy of any
of the substantive allegations of the SEC's complaint nor the accu-
racy of the information which gave rise to the amended decree, to
those who have not followed recent developments the scope of the
relief agreed to is startling. As a result of the new unaffiliated direc-
tors who are required to determine whether to sue former manage-
ment and to publicize the grounds for the suit, the Special Counsel
who must make an investigation and file a public report, and the
Special Auditor who is to conduct a special audit, effective control
over the corporation was removed from incumbent management.
While an outright receiver was not sought, the relief obtained is just
as comprehensive from a practical standpoint.
Some foreshadowing of the Mattel decree can be found in SEC v.
"SEC Litigation Release No. 6531 (Oct. 2, 1974).
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Great Coastal Gas Corp.59 As with Clinton Oil, a former SEC Com-
missioner publicly praised Great Coastal as representing a great step
forward in the SEC's enforcement process and as an example of struc-
turing new and effective decrees to fit the violations."0
Great Coastal was based on a series of alleged violations of the
anti-fraud provisions" and reporting requirements 2 of the 1934 Act.
Generally, the alleged misrepresentations and omissions related to
discussions concerning Great Coastal's gas reserves and the ability to
deliver production to consumers. As part of the consent decree, a
major change in the management of Great Coastal occurred. The
number of directors was increased from ten to thirteen, with six new
independent directors satisfactory to the SEC to be designated by the
court and elected by the directors. In addition, a new Executive Com-
mittee comprised of three people, two of whom were to be designated
by the court and approved by the Commission, was to be elected. At
the company's expense, the Executive Committee was to "retain in-
dependent legal counsel to advise them regarding their functions as
directors or as members of the Executive Committee, or as to any
other related matters which may arise." 3 The settlement of the case
also involved the appointment of an independent audit committee
consisting of three members, the majority of whom were to be new,
unaffiliated members of the board.
In assessing the significance of this decree, two major factors
quickly emerge. First, the appointment of the new independent direc-
tors, executive committee, and audit committee deprived incumbent
management, alleged to be the principal wrongdoers, of their domi-
nant control over Great Coastal. Thus, these former insiders were
forced to deal with disinterested directors" and to persuade them that
particular actions were wise and legal before committing the corpora-
tion to a course of action or consummating a particular transaction.
The second significant factor emerging from Great Coastal is the
requirement that the Executive Committee retain independent coun-
sel. This is a novel aspect of the decree and appears to be intended
to ensure through outside legal advice that the independent directors
will be an effective influence. Generally, corporate counsel advises
51SEC Litigation Release No. 6054 (Sept. 12, 1973).
"Speech of former SEC Commissioner Hugh Owens before the North American
Securities Administrators, September 1973.
"Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970).
"2Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1970).
"SEC Litigation Release No. 6054 (Sept. 12, 1973).
"To insure that the new directors are in fact disinterested, the decree provided
that they must be persons acceptable to the SEC.
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directors as a group. In an industrial and commercial corporation it
is unusual for committees of directors to have different counsel. Cor-
porations generally have a long-standing relationship with counsel,
and a court-ordered intrusion by new, outside counsel is a significant
deviation from the norm. The significance of this portion of the decree
can readily be imagined by picturing the disruption, confusion and
disagreement in the board room when one counsel in good faith rec-
ommends one course of action and the second counsel in good faith
disagrees.
The message which can be gleaned from Great Coastal is that the
SEC will go to great lengths to fashion decrees which will restructure
management or relieve management of its absolute control over sensi-
tive corporate operations if such relief is necessary because of incum-
bent management's apparent insensitivity to its obligations under
the securities laws.
Another noteworthy case involving the adoption of tailored inter-
nal procedures and controls to prevent the repetition of particular
violations is SEC v. General Host, Inc.65 In General Host, the SEC
charged a number of violations of the 1933 Act,8 the 1934 Act" and
the Investment Company Act of 19408 in connection with General
Host's takeover of both Armour & Company and Lil' General Stores,
Inc. Violations were also alleged in connection with the two takeovers
as a result of transactions involving the Goldfield Corporation. The
case was settled by consent, including the entry of the usual injunc-
tions against future violations.
In addition, General Host was ordered by the court to adopt cer-
tain internal procedures designed to preclude the future possibility
of violations of the nature alleged in the complaint. These procedures
were "to be employed in connection with any plan or attempt to
acquire control of any corporation . . . by means of a tender offer,
exchange offer, merger, consolidation or other business combination
in connection with any plan or attempt to acquire control of such
corporation." 9 The decree provided, however, that the procedures
were applicable only when the corporation sought to be acquired was
subject to the reporting requirements of the 1934 Act or has pre-
viously made a public offering of its securities.
The procedures General Host was required to adopt included the
65SEC Litigation Release No. 6164 (Dec. 13, 1973).
"115 U.S.C. § 77a, et seq. (1970).
615 U.S.C. § 78a, et seq. (1970).
"15 U.S.C. § 80a-1, et seq. (1970).
"SEC Litigation Release No. 6164 (Dec. 13, 1973).
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appointment of "an acquisition supervisor" with the authority to
supervise all acquisitions, the convening of meetings of officers and
directors to advise them of the terms of the consent decree and of
applicable federal securities laws, and the periodic convening of
meetings to review the progress of any acquisition attempts which are
being made. Minutes were ordered to be kept of such meetings, in-
cluding reports of financing, tenders of shares, and of contacts with
outside individuals, underwriters, dealer-managers or other agents.
The prescribed procedures also required that provisions be adopted
to assure that press releases were accurate. Furthermore, the decree
prohibited certain contacts outside General Host.
Another case involving the effective imposition by the Commis-
sion of internal controls is SEC v. Sunshine Mining Co.7" In this case,
the SEC alleged material defects in the proxy material of Sunshine
Mining for three years, in that the proxy material failed to disclose
the existence of certain "personal arrangements and agreements"
which enabled the Chief Executive Officer of Sunshine and others to
acquire control of a second company. Further alleged defects in the
proxy material involved failure to disclose various corporate bank
deposits which enabled Sunshine directors to obtain loans at the
same banks. The SEC's basic allegation Was that Sunshine's proxy
material was defective by failing to disclose the indirect benefits
conferred upon the directors as a result of such transactions.
To settle this case, Sunshine and the other defendants first con-
sented to an injunction against future violations of the proxy provi-
sions of the 1934 Act. 1 In addition, the court ordered Sunshine to
institute and comply with internal procedures satisfactory to the
SEC. These procedures provided for investigations by a committee
of Sunshine's directors to determine whether Sunshine's cash depos-
its and investments in certificates of deposit and comparable money
market instruments issued by banks were made for valid business
purposes and whether they conferred any material direct or indirect
economic benefit on any director, nominee for director, or executive
officer of Sunshine. Sunshine was also ordered to communicate to
shareholders the material facts alleged in the Commission's com-
plaint, the substance of the SEC's allegations, and the substance of
the terms and provisions of the consent judgment. Such information
was required to be given to all stockholders of record prior to the next
meeting of Sunshine stockholders for the election of directors.
7 SEC Litigation Release No. 6544 (Oct. 11, 1974).
7 1Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1970).
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As with General Host, Great Coastal and Mattel, the Sunshine
Mining decree was tailored to deal with specific transactions and
alleged violations. As a general matter, the Sunshine Mining decree
is essentially a disclosure decree 2 in that it compels dissemiriation of
information to stockholders. The aspect of the decree that is not
related to disclosure, at least potentially, is the appointment of the
investigating committee. Looking to the future, what will occur if the
committee determines that the transactions were improper? Will the
company be compelled to sue the officers and directors involved to
avoid being sued itself by irate shareholders? Unfortunately, the de-
cree is silent on this significant point.
It should also be noted that under the decree the company is
binding itself to disclose in its forthcoming proxy material certain
information, i.e., the details of the criticized transactions. Failure to
make such disclosures could involve a violation of the terms of the
decree and thus be grounds for a contempt citation.3 A contempt
citation could result even if the transactions were immaterial7" and
nondisclosure otherwise was proper under the proxy rules. In light of
these two factors, it would be a mistake to assume that Sunshine
Mining represents any retreat by the SEC.
SEC v. Canadian Javelin, Ltd.,75 is another recent case settled by
consent which resulted in the creation of various internal controls.
Canadian Javelin was a lengthy and hotly contested proceeding
which began in November, 1973, when the SEC filed a civil injunctive
action, generally alleging violations of the registration provisions of
the 1933 Act, the making of false and misleading statements, and the
filing of false and inaccurate documents with the Commission. More
72As was the decree in the first case analyzed in this article, SEC v. Koenig, 469
F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1972).
"Contempt citations may be issued by federal district courts under their tradi-
tional contempt powers upon application by the SEC for such citations.
71Schedule 14A (the format for proxy statements) promulgated by the SEC under
§ 14 of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1970), provides that transactions
between an issuer and members of its management are not material and therefore not
required to be disclosed if the amount involved does not exceed $40,000. 17 C.F.R. §
240.14a-101 (1974). Another test of "materiality" under the Securities Exchange Act
is found in Form 10-K promulgated by the SEC pursuant to § 13 of the Securities
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1970). In that form litigation is not deemed material
and therefore is not required to be disclosed, if the claim for damages does not exceed
10% of the current assets of the company. The general definition of materiality under
the Securities Exchange Act, however, is found in Rule 12b-2, which limits materiality
"to those matters as to which an average prudent investor ought reasonably to be
informed. . . ." 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (1974).
75SEC Exchange Act Release No. 11172 (Jan. 9, 1975).
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specifically, the SEC alleged that the defendants issued numerous
false and misleading press releases and other statements concerning
the company's copper project in Panama and another prior corporate
project in Newfoundland. In addition to the usual injunctions against
future violations of the securities laws, the SEC sought a special
receiver and other ancillary relief.
In July, 1974, the defendants consented to the entry of permanent
injunctions against violations of the anti-fraud, reporting, and regis-
tration provisions of the securities laws. 7 The judgment entered by
the court also required the board of directors of the company to con-
sist of at least 40% outside independent directors 7 satisfactory to the
SEC. The company was further ordered to establish a standing com-
pliance committee, a majority of which was to consist of independent
outside directors. This committee was to screen and pass upon all
information the company disseminated to the public. In addition, the
company was required to designate a public information officer re-
sponsible for dissemination of all such information and to name a
special outside counsel satisfactory to the Commission. Finally, the
court ordered the filing with the SEC of all necessary reports and all
amendments and supplements thereto as may be required to satisfy
the disclosure obligations under the federal securities laws.
In its most basic terms, Canadian Javelin is a touting case involv-
ing over-aggressive public relations activities, to the extent that they
became allegedly deceptive. The relief decreed was structured to deal
with the public relations excesses which led to the violations alleged
in the SEC's complaint and in that respect represents another tai-
lored decree. Nevertheless, while the Canadian Javelin decree essen-
tially focuses upon disclosure, it would again be a mistake to assume
that Canadian Javelin represents any retreat by the SEC in the en-
forcement area. The only alleged violations related to disclosure deft-
cencies, yet a restructuring of the board of directors was obtained.
This relief apparently was viewed by the SEC as an adjunct to proper
disclosure procedures by placing independent directors in a position
to influence disclosure policies. It is noteworthy that the elements of
"Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970); Securities Exchange Act of
1934 10(b), 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) (1970); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13, 15 U.S.C. §
78m (1970).
"The Securities Exchange Act contains no provision which prescribes the required
composition of the Board of Directors of a public company. In contrast, § 10(a) of the
Investment Company Act requires at least 40% of the directors of a registered invest-
ment company to be independent. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10 (1970). This appears to be the
genesis of the independent director requirement of Canadian Javelin.
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diversion of assets or improper use of funds were not alleged, so that
there was no basis whatsoever for seeking a receiver or similar relief.
Sham transactions, diversion of funds, willful falsification of fin-
ancial statements and results of operations, as well as a series of false
filings with the SEC provide the factual background for another case,
the settlement of which involved some rather exotic relief. In the
complaint filed in SEC v. Allegheny Beverage Corp.,"8 the Commis-
sion alleged violations of the anti-fraud, registration, reporting, and
proxy provisions of the federal securities laws.
The SEC charged that the three corporate and four individual
defendants engaged in a sham public debenture offering, "the terms
of which required that unless at least $10 million was raised, all
monies received were to be returned to investors and the offering
discontinued." 9 The Commission alleged that the offering raised only
$500,000, but that the defendants created the appearance of having
raised $10 million by several sham transactions and thus retained the
$500,000. The SEC further contended that the defendants issued mis-
leading press releases and an annual report to stockholders which
materially overstated income from the sale of vending machines. The
overstatement of revenues and income involved sales of vending ma-
chines to new companies in shaky financial condition, for which ei-
ther no down-payments or very small down-payments were required.
Such sales produced $16.7 million in revenues and $3.1 million in
income out of the year's total income of $6.9 million. Since the collec-
tibility of the notes arising from many sales was doubtful due to the
precarious financial condition of the machine purchasers, the Com-
mission argued that revenue and income should not have been recog-
nized from the receipt of the notes. The SEC further alleged the
personal use of $540,000 of corporate funds by the president of the
three corporations.
In addition to the usual injunctions against violations of the secur-
ities laws, the court's decree included an order for broad ancillary
relief directing that:
1 The president of the companies pay $70,000 to ABC, re-
flecting gains from his use of corporate funds and his insider
trading, $25,000 of which is to be set aside for compensation
for losses to individual purchasers of ABC stock alleged to have
been sold by the president and other officers in violation of the
anti-fraud provisions of the Federal securities laws;
7 SEC Litigation Release No. 6670 (Jan. 8, 1975).
7 Id.
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2 A special agent be appointed to confirm the return to ABC
by the president of $540,000 of corporate funds alleged by the
SEC to have been personally used by the president;
3 ABC establish an independent audit committee, composed
of unaffiliated persons acceptable to the SEC and ABC and
approved by the Court, to select independent certified public
accountants to conduct ABC's annual audits; to approve or
disapprove ABC's management decision to change such ac-
countants; to determine the position and policy of ABC in any
dispute or disagreement between ABC's management and the
independent accountants; and to formulate the position of
ABC's management, including the president, in any request by
the accountants for any documents or information requested
of the president by the accountants;
4 The president make available to ABC's accountants, if
needed, in the audit of ABC, any personal documents or other
materials requested by the accountants;
5 The three companies and the president file with the SEC
reports containing a full and accurate description of any future
transaction, direct or indirect, between ABC and its president;
and
6 ABC file with the SEC amended annual and periodic re-
ports in accordance with the allegations of the complaint."
Following the trend of the previously discussed cases, Allegheny
Beverage is yet another indication of the uniquely tailored forms of
relief the SEC may obtain as the price of settling an enforcement case
by consent.
A slightly different but nonetheless novel approach was incorpo-
rated in the consent decree in SEC v. Union Planters Corp.8 In this
case, a bank holding company, its principal bank, a broker-dealer,
and various individuals allegedly engaged in a fraudulent scheme in
violation of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the 1934 Act. The alleged
scheme principally related to improper valuations and sales of securi-
ties in the bank's investment and trading accounts.
Specifically, the SEC's complaint charged that securities which
had declined in value since their original purchase were transferred
from the Bank's securities trading account to its securities invest-
ment account. Since the bank valued securities in the investment
account at original cost, no downward valuation or write-down oc-
90Id.
11CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,003 (W.D.Tenn. Feb. 7, 1975).
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curred. The SEC further alleged that the various defendants created
an arrangement whereby the Bank from time to time would sell cer-
tain securities to the broker-dealer at prices in excess of the market
value of the securities. Such transactions enabled the Bank either to
conceal losses which otherwise would have occurred or to report in-
flated trading account profits. At the same time, the Bank entered
into an arrangement with the broker-dealer to repurchase the securi-
ties at a later time and to guarantee the broker-dealer against any
losses on the transactions.
To settle this case, the defendants consented to court-ordered
undertakings in lieu of injunctions against future violations of the
anti-fraud provisions of the 1934 Act.8" In addition, the bank holding
company and the Bank undertook to establish certain detailed proce-
dures to prevent future violations, which were incorporated in the
court order." The undertakings are lengthy, but deserve considera-
tion in their entirety because of their novelty and potential signifi-
cance. They include the following:
1 The preparation and circulation not less frequently than
semi-annually to each officer, trader or salesman in the Invest-
ment Division of an extract of the applicable current Rules of
Fair Practice of the NASD;
2 The review of the Investment Division, at least annually,
under the direction and guidance of the chief administrative
officer of the Company, with the advice and assistance of his
chief financial officer and legal counsel, to insure that its poli-
cies and procedures with respect to both the Trading Account
and Investment Account and the legal, accounting and record
keeping requirements and procedures in the Division and its
Operations Department are in compliance with applicable
law;
3 The preparation of written guidelines to Trading Account
and Investment Account policies including: types of securities,
general mix of securities, maximum underwriting positions,
reporting of losses, valuation procedures, reporting slow mov-
ing inventory, concessions on purchases and sales, forbidden
transactions and approvals and review of transactions;
4 The written confirmation by the officers, traders and sales-
men in the Investment Division of the trading and investment
policies and guidelines;
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5 The preparation and circulation to all appropriate person-
nel of a detailed statement of accounting policies and require-
ments for security transactions within the Investment Divi-
sion, covering the trading account, investment account, and
special situations such as: short sales, arbitrage transactions,
commercial paper and money market activity including
federal funds, securites sold under agreements to repurchase,
securities purchased under agreements to resell, and certifi-
cates of deposits sold to New York banks;
6 The implementation of a continuing training program for
the Investment Division's personnel, including a periodic re-
view of previously established policies;
7 The continuous review by the Manager of the Investment
Division, with the advice of counsel, of legal developments
relating to applicable securities activities and the dissemina-
tion of legal advice defining illegal activities, including free
riding to all personnel in the Investment Division and periodic
confirmation of such personnel that any employee is subject to
immediate dismissal who (1) engaged in any practice or activ-
ity which is either illegal or contrary to established Bank policy
or procedures or (2) invests personally, whether directly or
indirectly, in any security other than with the limitations es-
tablished by the Division without the specific approval of the
Manager;
8 The monthly reporting by the Operations Department of
the Investment Division, with responsibility for the orderly
handling of paperwork, book entries and the implementation
in that Division of the Bank's accounting policies and require-
ments, to both the Manager of the Bond Investment Division
and the Bank's Financial Division;
9 The maintenance as soon as practicable hereafter of the
books and records of the Investment Division relating to all
securities transactions and positions in accordance with the
applicable provisions of Regulation 240.17a-3 under Section 17
of the Exchange Act;
10 The establishment of a management committee to include
at least three outside directors of the Bank to supervise specifi-
cally the Investment Division and transactions involving its
Investment Account and Trading Account, which Committee
shall meet at least monthly and shall submit to the Board of
Directors regular reports on the status and operations of that
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Division.84
This case has two noteworthy features. The first is the internal
procedures and controls which the Bank agreed to adopt. The proce-
dures are quite extensive and relate directly to the internal operations
of a national bank which is subject to extensive regulation by federal
banking authorities. From the standpoint of regulatory agency juris-
diction, one must wonder why these internal procedures and improve-
ments were not mandated by banking authorities rather than in.the
context of settlement of an SEC enforcement case. Traditionally,
banks have objected vociferously to any efforts by the SEC to exert
jurisdiction over banking matters, even in such less controversial
areas as bank stock transfer agent operations. The intrusion of the
SEC into the internal operations and procedures of a bank in the
context of a Rule 10b-5 proceeding potentially represents greater sub-
stantive SEC control over banks than many authorities have ever
imagined.
The second significant factor of the Union Planters settlement is
that no injunction was entered. In lieu of injunctions embodying the
foregoing procedures as mandatory relief, the Bank agreed to court-
ordered undertakings in lieu of injunctions which were made part of
the court order. Since this case was settled by consent, the order
contains no explanation of the rationale supporting the use of under-
takings as opposed to injunctions. A between-the-lines analysis of the
complaint and the final decree gives rise to one possibility. That
possibility is that the alleged fraudulent scheme was essentially an
individual frolic by some of its officers and employees, lacking the
approval, condonation or even knowledge of the senior officers and
directors of the Bank. If so, this may have been the bargaining tool
which convinced the SEC to settle on the basis of undertakings,
which seemingly constitute less of a stigma than injunctions.
It is interesting to note that no provision of the '33 or '34 Acts
refers to undertakings or to any power of the SEC to seek compliance
with undertakings by way of motions for contempt citations. How-
ever, it seems highly unlikely that the SEC would accede to such a
settlement unless it were confident that it could compel compliance.
This apparent power, coupled with the fact that the Bank continues
to be subject to internal regulation by banking authorities, may well
have been the controlling factors in dictating this unique settlement.
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V. Political Campaign Contributions and Ancillary Relief
The Watergate aftermath has produced other interesting exam-
ples of ancillary relief in SEC enforcement action. Based on the few
cases which have arisen in this context, it seems abundantly clear
that the Commission regards this area as one which requires ancillary
relief in all instances. The background for these cases generally in-
volves an allegation by the SEC that proxy material or periodic re-
ports filed with the SEC are defective because such documents failed
to disclose that the corporation and its executives made illegal cam-
paign contributions from corporate funds.
The first significant example of such a case is SEC v. American
Shipbuilding Co.15 In American Shipbuilding, the SEC sued Ameri-
can Shipbuilding and its president, George Steinbrenner, also the
president and principal owner of the New York Yankees, alleging
various violations of the proxy and reporting rules of the SEC in that
American Shipbuilding failed to disclose and/or concealed the fact
that it was making various political contributions from corporate
funds, in violation of federal election and campaign laws. The SEC
also alleged that American Shipbuilding maintained a secret slush
fund composed of corporate funds, which various executives were
using to make political campaign contributions in an effort to elect
public officials favorable to the corporation.
To remedy these alleged violations, the SEC sought various forms
of relief, including the customary injunction against future violations
and the correction of prior filings with the SEC. In addition, the SEC
sought repayment by Mr. Steinbrenner of all campaign contributions
made by him with corporate funds, and the appointment of a special
master to examine American Shipbuilding's books and records to
determine its financial position and to report to the stockholders and
the SEC all corporate funds illegally used for political purposes. The
case was settled by consent without any admission or denial of viola-
tions of the securities laws.
The aspect of most significance is the special master, having full
access to all corporate records, the power to interview various corpo-
rate officials and the power to publish potentially damaging reports.
In American Shipbuilding, management has not been displaced. In
fact, material inaccuracies"6 in financial statements may not exist. In
addition, there is no allegation of diversion of funds in the sense of
"SEC Litigation Release No. 6532 (Oct. 4, 1974).
"Trhe amount of money involved could easily be immaterial in comparison to the
assets of the company, particularly if the company were a major corporation.
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personal profit.
Despite the absence of violations of such an egregious nature, a
special receiver was still sought. Furthermore, without any basis for
concluding that the corporation and its management would not com-
ply voluntarily with a court decree ordering full disclosure," the con-
trol over that disclosure was delivered to an outside party. This is the
most significant factor in the case, and one can only speculate that
the SEC has concluded that violations of federal campaign contribu-
tion laws are so outrageous that anyone who has engaged in such
activity cannot be relyed upon to comply with a decree of a federal
court.
The rationale for such a conclusion by the SEC is weak, if not
totally unwarranted, but no other basis for the SEC's actions is read-
ily apparent. There are many instances in which corporate officers
cause a corporation to commit acts which violate some provision of
state or federal law. But it is inconceivable that such action automat-
ically demonstrates that the executives are so callous that they would
disregard a federal court's injunction. The basis for determining that
violations of federal campaign contribution laws are more reprehensi-
ble than violations of, e.g., the Occupational Safety and Health Act,8"
appears non-existent.
SEC v. Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co. 9 may be an
even more significant case involving ancillary relief where the alleged
securities laws violations are based upon concealment or non-
disclosure of illegal corporate political contributions. 3M is one of the
largest corporations in the United States and a highly regarded mem-
ber of the major corporate community, factors which lend great sig-
nificance to the decree ultimately entered in settlement of the SEC's
action.
In its complaint, the Commission charged that 3M, its chairman,
and two former officers violated the federal securities laws by con-
cealing the existence of a $634,000 slush fund from which 3M made
political contributions. The SEC alleged that 3M and the individual
defendants disguised the fund by falsifying the corporation's books
and records and by filing false proxy material and false periodic re-
ports with the SEC.
Settlement of the action was by consent, without any admission
87A determination by the court that the defendants cannot be relied upon to
comply with the terms of an injunction has been cited as the rationale behind ancillary
relief, such as a receiver. See, e.g., SEC v. Koenig, 469 F.2d 198, 202 (2d Cir. 1972).
829 U.S.C. § 651, et seq. (1970).
SSEC Litigation Release No. 6711 (Feb. 10, 1975).
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or denial of violation of the law. In addition to injunctions against
proxy and periodic reporting rule violations, the court also enjoined
the defendants from using corporate funds for illegal political pur-
poses. In sum and substance, this amounts to enforcement by the
SEC of the federal laws controlling campaign contributions, not
merely the enforcement of the federal securities laws. Furthermore,
the court ordered 3M to appoint a special agent approved by the SEC
to investigate and report on whether 3M had disguised the real use
of other corporate funds. Finally, the three individual defendants
were ordered to pay or to arrange for the payment of at least $425,000
in order to reimburse 3M for their improper expenditures.
There are at least two aspects of this consent decree which deserve
note. First, the making of illegal campaign contributions is not, in
and of itself, a violation of the federal securities laws. The violation
would occur only if the transaction rose to the level of materiality0
requiring its disclosure in SEC filings, and such disclosures were not
made. Yet the injunction entered enjoins not only violations of the
securities laws arising from nondisclosure, but also violations of fed-
eral campaign contribution laws.
Second, a special investigative agent was appointed. This was
done notwithstanding the fact that the injunction also enjoined 3M
from failing to disclose other such illegal contributions. The appoint-
ment of a special agent in addition to a federal court order directing
full disclosure must be based on some determination that the defen-
dants could not be relied upon to follow the court's directive, even in
light of the powers of the court to compel compliance by way of
contempt proceedings, civil and criminal. As was pointed out in SEC
v. Koenig,"' one rationale for the appointment of a limited disclosure
receiver was the district court's conclusion "that it [could not] rely
on defendants to implement the direction [order] of the Court.
'9 2
The question must be asked either whether 3M qualifies as such a
recalcitrant defendant or whether the SEC views the concealment of
illegal campaign contributions as so abhorrent that its existence
proves that defendants cannot be relied upon to comply voluntarily
with the Court's injunction.
"'See note 74 supra, for a discussion of the term "material." With a corporation
the size of 3M, a compelling argument can be made that $634,000 is immaterial in
terms of the overall financial position of the company. This factor lends credence to
the theory that, in the political contribution area, the SEC is focusing on the nature
of the violation rather than the amount involved.
"i469 F.2d 198 ( d Cir. 1972).
92[1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,536, at 92,561
(S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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These are serious considerations, especially when corporate defen-
dants with highly respected directors, auditors, and counsel are in-
volved. In addition, the fact that authorities other than the Commis-
sion have jurisdiction over the enforcement of federal election laws
raises yet another question as to the propriety of such deep SEC
involvement.
VI. Ancillary Relief and Proceedings Against Professionals
Thus far, only cases involving commercial corporations and indi-
viduals associated with them have been discussed. Yet, there is an-
other area of SEC enforcement activity involving forms of ancillary
relief of great significance. That involves the growing number of ac-
tions involving professionals, primarily accountants and lawyers. As
with corporate defendants, some recent proceedings involving profes-
sionals have been settled in a manner involving forms of ancillary
relief.
In instituting proceedings against professionals, the SEC has gen-
eral power to commence injunctive actions under the '33 and '34
Acts,93 as well as special powers contained in the SEC's Rules of
Practice. 4 Rule 2(e)(1),1 which governs professionals practicing be-
fore the SEC, provides:
The Commission may deny, temporarily or permanently
the privilege of appearing or practicing before it in any way to
any person who is found by the Commission after notice of and
opportunity for hearing in the matter (i) not to possess the
requisite qualifications to represent others, or (ii) to be lacking
in character or integrity or to have engaged in unethical or
improper professional conduct, or (iii) to have willfully vio-
lated, or willfully aided and abetted the violation of any provi-
sion of the federal securities laws (15 U.S.C. § 77a to 80b-20),
or the rules and regulations thereunder.
Further powers are conferred upon the SEC by Rule 2(e)(3):11
The Commission, with due regard to the public interest and
without preliminary hearing, may by order temporarily sus-
pend from appearing or practicing before it any attorney, ac-
"Securities Act of 1933 § 20(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1970); Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 21(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1970).
"17 C.F.R. § 201.1, et seq. (1974).
"317 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(1) (1974).
"17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(3) (1974).
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countant, engineer, or other professional or expert who, on or
after July 1,1971, has been by name
(a) Permanently enjoined by any court of competent juris-
diction by reason of his misconduct in an action brought by the
Commission from violation or aiding and abetting the violation
of any provision of the Federal securities laws (15 U.S.C. § 77a
to 80(b)-20) or of the rules and regulations thereunder; or
(b) Found by any court of competent jurisdiction in an
action brought by the Commission to which he is a party or
found by this Commission in any administrative proceeding to
which he is a party to have violated or aided and abetted the
violation of any provision of the Federal securities laws (15
U.S.C. § 77a to 80b- 20) or of the rules and regulations ther-
eunder (unless the violation was found not to have been will-
ful).
The SEC views all of its proceedings, including those against pro-
fessionals, as remedial in nature and not punitive." In fact, the SEC
does not have the power to levy punitive sanctions upon profession-
als, such as fines, but can impose only such sanctions as will correct
prior deficiencies and assure future compliance. This general back-
ground and the interrelation between the 1933 Act, the 1934 Act and
the Rules of Practice should be kept in mind when evaluating the
significance of several recent proceedings against professionals which
involve novel ancillary relief.
An administrative proceeding against the nationally-known ac-
counting firm of Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath
(LKH&H) 5 is the first such proceeding. It arose out of an injunctive
action brought by the SEC against a limited partnership engaged in
various investment activities.9 The financial statements of the part-
nership were certified by LKH&H. The SEC alleged that the finan-
cial statements were defective, inaccurate, and presented a mislead-
ing picture, and that the audit conducted by LKH&H was not in
accordance with generally accepted auditing standards. Without
admitting or denying the alleged violations, LKH&H consented to an
injunction against future violations.
Subsequently, the Commission commenced an administrative
'"The Courts have also ruled that the SEC cannot impose or seek to impose penal-
ties but is limited to relief of a remedial nature in all proceedings. See, e.g., SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
SgIn re Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, SEC Exchange Act Release No.
10172 (May 23, 1973).
"SEC v. Everest Mgt. Corp., 495 F.2d 1236 (2d Cir. 1972).
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proceeding against LKH&H under Rule 2(e)(3) of the Rules of Prac-
tice, based upon the entry of the injunction against LKH&H by
name. As part of the settlement of the administrative proceeding,
LKH&H agreed to adopt various internal controls and procedures,
some of them subject to prior approval by the SEC, to preclude future
violations of the type alleged in the SEC's complaint. The controls
and procedures are lengthy but are worth considering in detail in view
of the implications of this case.
First, LKH&H agreed to permit an investigation within 15
months from the entry of the injunction, to ascertain whether
LKH&H was conducting its accounting and auditing practice in com-
pliance with the standards and procedures they were required to
adopt and maintain under the injunction. This investigation was to
be conducted in accordance with methods and procedures generally
adopted or approved by the SEC, and furthermore, was to be at the
expense of LKH&H. At the option of the Commssion, this investiga-
tion was to be conducted either by a team of qualified professional
accountants composed of persons selected for that purpose by the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, or by a team of
qualified professional accountants composed of persons selected by
the Chief Accountant of the SEC: (i) from among persons designated
by the AICPA, or (ii) in the event that the AICPA did not designate
such persons within twelve months from the date of the injunction,
from among members of the AICPA; or (iii) from members of the staff
of the SEC. Such an investigation by fellow professionals is often
referred to as "peer review" and the concept has generated great
controversy among the accounting profession and members of the
securities bar. The reasons for the controversy are self-evident, and
the implications for other professionals as well as the accounting
profession are extensive.
In addition to peer review, LKH&H agreed for one year not to
merge with or acquire any other accounting firm without first submit-
ting to the Chief Accountant of the SEC evidence that LKH&H's
internal procedures with respect to mergers and acquisitions of other
accounting firms required by the injunction were being followed. This
control was designed to eliminate the possibility that a newly ac-
quired accounting firm would not be sufficiently familiar with the
procedures and controls LKH&H had agreed to adopt and employ in
connection with future audits. Finally, for a period of thirty days,
LKH&H agreed not to accept or undertake any new professional
engagement which could be expected to result in filings, submissions
or certifications with the SEC within one year.
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Shortly after the LKH&H decision, another nationally-known
accounting firm settled an SEC administrative proceeding on a simi-
lar basis. This case involved the widely-respected accounting firm of
Touche Ross & Co."'0 and arose out of Touche Ross' audit of certain
financial statements of U.S. Financial, Inc., a controversial and
highly publicized company. In the administrative proceeding, the
SEC concluded that the audit in question was not conducted in ac-
cordance with generally accepted auditing standards. This determi-
nation was made despite the fact that Touche Ross was intentionally
deceived by U.S. Financial's officers and directors, who furnished
false information and made various misrepresentations to Touche
Ross in connection with the audit. Touche Ross' principal defense
was that a proper audit would not necessarily have uncovered inten-
tional falsification, that any violation lay with the client and that an
accounting firm should not be responsible under such circumstan-
ces. '0 The SEC found this argument unconvincing.
Touche Ross was censured by the Commission and additionally
agreed to adopt internal procedures and controls "designed to im-
prove the firm's professional practices."10 The procedures include a
specific review in all future audit engagements to determine if there
was any private involvement by management or other related persons
in corporate transactions reflected in the financial statements under
examination. Touche Ross also agreed to conduct a review of all of
its branch offices by its national staff at least once every two years.
Touche Ross further agreed to an investigation after a period of one
year under the jurisdiction of the SEC as to the extent of compliance
with the procedures adopted. Finally, the San Diego office of Touche
Ross was prohibited from accepting any new professional engage-
ments for twelve months, and Touche Ross generally was prohibited
from accepting any new clients in the real estate development field
until the Commission's Chief Accountant was satisfied that the firm
had adopted adequate audit guidelines and programs for such clients.
The Touche Ross settlement represents another tailor-made de-
cree. U.S. Financial was involved in real estate development, and the
""In re Touche Ross & Co., SEC Securities Act Release No. 5459 (Feb. 25, 1974).
"'°The issue of auditors' responsibility for detecting fraud in the normal conduct
of an audit is one of the most hotly debated current topics. A great deal of this debate
is attributable to the Equity Funding Corporation scandal of 1973, involving willful
falsification of corporate records by insiders not detected in annual audits which had
the effect of creating millions of dollars of false assets. See SEC v. Equity Funding
Corp., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 93,917 (C:D. Cal. 1973).
'"'SEC Securities Act Release No. 5459 (Feb. 25, 1974).
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principal alleged deficiencies in their financial statements related to
the handling of transactions between the corporation and affiliated
persons. Even in light of the neatly tailored nature of the decree, the
fact remains that the settlement involved far-reaching remedies, di-
rect intrusion into the affairs of responsible professionals and
governmentally-dictated standards of professional responsibility.
The desirability of such a development or trend may be either appall-
ing or praiseworthy, depending upon personal viewpoints and politi-
cal philosophy. To underestimate the significance of these decisions
is, however, to ignore reality at substantial risk.
Carrying further the trend initiated by LKH&H and Touche Ross,
more comprehensive sanctions were levied on the accounting firm of
Benjamin Botwinick & Co."0 3 in early January, 1975. The Botwinick
administrative proceeding was an off-shoot of a civil injunctive action
brought by the SEC against Allegheny Beverage Corporation. 4
Among other things, the SEC alleged that Allegheny and Botwinick
caused false and misleading financial statements to be filed with the
SEC, which were audited by Botwinick. Both the corporation and the
accountants consented to certain injunctions, without admitting or
denying the allegations of the SEC's complaint.
The Commission then commenced a companion administrative
proceeding against Botwinick under Rule 2(e)"5 of the SEC's Rules
of Practice, based upon the entry of the injunction against Botwinick.
This administrative proceeding was also settled by consent. Under
the terms of the settlement, the SEC barred Botwinick from any
audit or accounting engagements for public companies for ten
months, barred a Botwinick partner involved in the Allegheny audit
from practicing before the SEC as a Botwinick partner for ten
months, ordered the partner to take 100 hours of continuing profes-
sional education during the ten-month period, ordered that each Bo-
twinick partner annually attend at least forty hours of similar in-
struction, and ordered peer review of Botwinick's auditing procedures
in general.
The bars from practicing and from accepting future business and
the peer review sanction are not surprising in light of LKH&H and
Touche Ross. The education requirement is a novel remedy, however.
The imposition of such a sanction compels one to surmise that the
SEC felt that the underlying defects were the result of inadequate
professional training or insufficient familiarity with current develop-
10In re Benjamin Botwinick & Co., Adm. Proc. File No. 3-3518 (Jan. 15, 1975).
'"SEC Litigation Release No. 6670 (Jan. 8, 1975).
'17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1974).
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ments. Yet the fact remains that the Botwinick partners were all
licensed public accountants who had previously demonstrated their
professional competence."'6
By imposing continuing professional education requirements, the
SEC is intruding directly into the internal affairs of licensed profes-
sionals with potentially far-reaching consequences. In point of fact,
it could be argued that this represents a form of "negative licensing
power" on the part of the SEC. Accountants, lawyers, and other
professionals are not now required to pass a test administered by the
SEC, and the trend at administrative agencies has been to eliminate
such tests. Nevertheless, in order to maintain its ability to practice
before the SEC, the Botwinick firm was required affirmatively to
demonstrate its professional competence and a level of current train-
ing.
Once again, the implications of this development are extensive.
Whether they are desirable or appalling may depend upon one's phil-
osophical viewpoint, but the fact remains that the SEC is involving
itself to an increasing degree in the internal operations of accounting
firms.
The liabilities of lawyers under the federal securities laws have
been and remain ill-defined in comparison to the accounting profes-
sion. Until the landmark case of SEC v. National Student Marketing
Corp., 07 in which a prominent Wall Street law firm was named as
defendant, the legal profession had been relatively unscathed. But
National Student Marketing was followed by SEC v. Spectrum,
Ltd., 0s and it is apparent that lawyers are now fair game. The lawyer
"By, among things, passing the necessary examinations to become certified pub-
lic accountants.
1"1360 F. Supp. 284 (D.D.C. 1973). National Student Marketing is a landmark
case dealing with attorney's liabilities under the federal securities laws. Named as a
defendant was a prominent Wall Street law firm, which the SEC alleged had partici-
pated in various fraudulent acts. This case is still pending against the law firm, but
the mere act of the SEC in filing such an action has prompted a broad examination of
attorneys' responsibilities under the securities laws.
108489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973). Spectrum arose out of sales of large blocks of
unregistered stock which were made in reliance upon counsel's opinion that such sales
were exempt from registration. The Second Circuit ruled that the attorney issuing such
an opinion could be an "aider and abettor" of a violation (itself a violation of the
securities laws) if the opinion were wrong and the attorney had acted negligently in
rendering the opinion. This represents a change from earlier cases which held an
attorney liable for securities laws violations only if he had actual knowledge of the
fraudulent scheme plus an intent to further the scheme. The court grounded its imposi-
tion of a negligence standard on the following theory: "In the distribution of unregis-
tered securities, the preparation of an opinion letter is too essential and the reliance
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practicing under the securities laws can ill-afford an ostrich-like ap-
proach; his livelihood and professional reputation may be at stake.
In re Jo M. Ferguson ' is a recent administrative proceeding
against an attorney which involved ancillary relief comparable to
that found in Botwinick, Touche Ross, and LKH&H. Mr. Ferguson
and his law firm acted as bond counsel in connection with an offering
of revenue bonds sold publicly to finance the construction of a nursing
home. The prospectus used in connection with the offering allegedly
failed to disclose certain material facts, including, among other
things, that the developer had contracted with a local contractor to
build the nursing home for $650,000 less than the price the developer
was to be paid by the municipality to build the facility, that the
"independent" consultant passing on the need for and feasibility of
the project was not independent but had a 50% interest in the devel-
oper's profits, and that a second feasibility consultant had issued
unfavorable reports on the project.
The SEC alleged that because of his review of the prospectus, his
pre-existing relationship with the developer in other municipal bond
offerings, and other factors which came to his attention, Ferguson
should have known of the material omissions from the prospectus,
even if he did not know. The SEC contended that Ferguson therefore
had willfully aided and abetted violations of § 17(a) of the 1933 Act"'
and § 10(b)"' and Rule 10b-512 of the 1934 Act.
Ferguson submitted an offer of settlement"' which the SEC ac-
cepted, resulting in a censure of Ferguson. In determining whether to
accept the settlement offer, the SEC considered certain mitigating
factors."4 These included the fact that Ferguson and his law firm had
voluntarily adopted a number of revised internal procedures and con-
trols relating to their involvement in municipal bond offerings. These
of the public too high to permit due diligence to be cast aside in the name of conveni-
ence." Id. at 542.
'"SEC Securities Act Release No. 5523 (Aug. 21, 1974).
"15 U.S.C. § ,77q(a) (1970).
"115 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
11217 C.F.R. § 240.20b-5 (1974).
"'Procedurally, the fashion in which SEC administrative proceedings are settled
usually involves rounds of negotiation between the SEC staff and respondent's counsel,
with the results of the negotiations embodied in an offer of settlement submitted by
respondent's counsel to the staff. This is then presented to the SEC for its approval or
rejection. Rule 8 of the SEC's Rules of Practice specifically authorizes such offers of
settlement. 17 C.F.R. § 201.8 (1974).
"'Mitigating factors are generally spelled out in detail in the offer of settlement
as a means of persuading the SEC to accept the offer. Depending on the circumstances,
this part of the offer can be quite extensive, as was the case in Ferguson.
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procedures required that members of the firm meet and discuss all
of their active cases every two weeks. Affirmative approval of each
partner was required before the issuance of any legal opinion on bond
offerings. The firm was also to undertake appropriate investigation
when acting as bond counsel, including among other things, obtain-
ing independently-audited financial statements and inquiring into
the background of the parties connected with the bond offering. Writ-
ten evidence of such investigation and the results thereof were then
to be reviewed by the partners of the firm. Third, an appropriate
"engagement letter" must be prepared and sent to all interested par-
ties before commencing work on any bond offering, emphasizing that
the firm's duty is to the issuer and the prospective bondholders. Such
letters are required to define the scope of the firm's work as bond
counsel and require submission of certain pertinent information.
Fourth, in connection with all bond offerings, the firm must require
independently audited financial statements, representations from
appropriate interested persons concerning the accuracy and com-
pleteness of the statements about them in any offering circulars, and
a statement from counsel for any lessee or guarantor that such coun-
sel has reviewed the offering circular and is aware of no inaccuracies
therein. Finally, the partners and associates of the firm are required
at least annually to attend municipal bond workshops and seminars,
as part of a continuing legal education program.
This relief is, of course, similar to the Botwinick approach. There
is, however, a distinct procedural difference between Botwinick,
LKH&H and Touche Ross, as opposed to Ferguson. In the three
proceedings involving accounting firms, the order for revision of inter-
nal procedures, continuing professional education or peer review con-
stituted part of the SEC's order. In Ferguson, the only sanction in the
order is a censure; the other "sanctions" represent voluntary proce-
dures adopted by Ferguson and his firm, apparently to persuade the
SEC to settle the proceeding with only a censure." ' While this dis-
tinction may seem insignificant, it deserves further analysis. Is it
possible that the Commission feels that it has greater jurisdiction
over accountants than over lawyers, and that the SEC perceives it
has greater latitude in fashioning sanctions in cases involving accoun-
tants? While there is no basis for this difference under Rule 2(e),
historically the SEC has had greater influence over accounting firms
than law firms. The Ferguson settlement creates the appearance that
the SEC may view lawyers and accountants differently, and this
r5The adoption of these voluntary procedures was recited in the offer of settlement
as mitigating factors to persuade the SEC to confine its sanctions to a censure.
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possible distinction is therefore well worth noting.
There is one further development in the area of sanctions against
professionals which deserves comment, although its relationship to
ancillary relief may be indirect. This involves a proposed SEC rule
which was issued in 1974 and withdrawn in March 1975 dealing with
administrative proceedings against professionals. If adopted, it would
have required that all proceedings under Rule 2(e) "shall be public
unless the Commission, on its own motion or at the request of a party
should direct otherwise.""' Presently, all such proceedings are non-
public unless the SEC directs otherwise.
This proposed amendment prompted strong criticism from the
organized bar on the grounds that the function of such a proceeding
is to determine if violations have occurred and if sanctions are appro-
priate. The bar contended that professional reputations based on long
years of practice would be severely damaged merely by the publicity
engendered by the public announcement of a Rule 2(e) proceeding.
Attorneys argued very strongly that a subsequent dismissal of such a
proceeding without the imposition of sanctions or findings of viola-
tions would not totally restore the good name and reputation of the
attorney or law firm involved.
As a result of these strenuous objections, in March 1975 the SEC
withdrew the proposed amendment to Rule 2(e)(7). In announcing
the withdrawal, the SEC nonetheless took the opportunity to warn
all professionals practicing before it that withdrawal of the proposed
amendment did not constitute a determination that all future disci-
plinary proceedings under Rule 2(e) would be private. It stated that
there were certain circumstances which could warrant conducting
public proceedings against professionals and that the language of
existing Rule 2(e)(7) conferred upon the SEC the discretion to order
public proceedings when it deemed such proceedings to be in the
public interest. The Commission also stated that it had instructed its
staff that all professional disciplinary proceedings were to be con-
ducted as expeditiously as possible in order to achieve a prompt
resolution of the issues presented. It further noted that if private
proceedings against professionals were unduly delayed by dilatory
tactics, the SEC could use that factor as a basis for determining that
public proceedings might be more appropriate.
117
Although the proposed amendment to Rule 2(e)(7) was not
adopted, its mere proposal and the warnings of the SEC accompany-
"'SEC Securities Act Release No. 5477 (Apr. 5, 1974).
"'SEC Securities Act Release No. 5572 (Mar. 4, 1975).
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ing the withdrawal should be sufficient notice to professionals, in-
cluding lawyers, that they occupy- no sacred status in the SEC's eyes
and that the full gamut of sanctions will be pursued under appropri-
ate circumstances. These sanctions could include public proceedings,
resulting in great notoriety and potential damage to professional rep-
utations. In short, the warning to attorneys should be absolutely
clear, notwithstanding the withdrawal of the proposed amendment.
VII. Conclusion
The cases and proceedings discussed in this article should serve
as an emphatic warning to all companies, corporate officers and
directors, and professionals who have any contact whatsoever with
the federal securities laws that § 20(b) of the 1933 Act and § 20(e) of
the 1934 Act cannot be read as practical limitations on remedies that
the SEC may seek in enforcement proceedings. Regardless of whether
as a matter of policy or law the SEC should be able to exact sanctions
or remedies beyond the literal scope of those two sections, failure to
recognize that such exactions occur and are occurring at an accelerat-
ing rate is short-sighted. The significance of this trend which has
taken place without specific statutory authorization is heightened by
an examination of other provisions of the federal securities laws,
which in contrast to the '33 and '34 Acts specifically confer upon the
'SEC extensive statutory powers in certain areas.
Section 6 of the 1934 Act specifically provides that no securities
exchange can be registered unless its rules, as filed with the SEC, call
for the "expulsion, suspension, or disciplining of a member for con-
duct . . . inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade
... "I" In addition, the SEC can deny registration unless the ex-
change has satisfied the SEC that its operations will comply with all
provisions of the 1934 Act and the rules and regulations promulgated
thereunder. In addition, "the rules of the exchange must be just and
adequate to insure fair dealing and to protect investors . . .-.
On a continuing basis, the SEC is given further specific statutory
powers over the internal affairs of exchanges by § 19 of the 1934 Act,'20
including the power to withdraw the registration of an exchange if the
exchange is found to have violated any provision of the 1934 Act or
to expel any member or officer of a national securities exchange upon
findings of similar violations and to suspend trading on an exchange.
"'Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 6(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (1970).
"'Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 6(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(d) (1970).
'15 U.S.C. § 78s (1970).
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The SEC is also empowered under § 19(b) of the 1934 Act "to alter
or supplement the rules of such exchange" 2 ' upon making certain
findings.
The Investment Company Act of 1940,12 which regulates "regis-
tered investment companies," provides further examples of the
SEC's specific statutory powers over internal corporate matters. The
1940 Act is a combination of a disclosure act and an act embodying
substantive, internal regulatory features. Such substantive features
are exemplified by § 9(a),12 which makes it illegal for certain persons
to serve as officers, directors, or employees of a registered investment
company. These ineligible persons include persons convicted of cer-
tain felonies, as well as persons enjoined from violations of the federal
securities laws. In addition, § 10(a)124 requires that the board of direc-
tors of a registered investment company be composed of at least 40%
unaffiliated persons, or independent directors. Section 10(b) 17 of the
1940 Act further requires that a majority of directors of an investment
company be independent of investment bankers with whom the in-
vestment company does business, and § 10(c)12 precludes a registered
investment company from having as a majority of its directors per-
sons affiliated with any one bank.
Substantive controls over the internal details of reorganizations of
investment companies are conferred by § 2512 of the 1940 Act. Under
§ 25(b), 1 the SEC is empowered under certain circumstances -to
render advisory reports on the fairness to security holders of a pro-
posed reorganization, and under § 25(c), '12 the Commission can seek
to enjoin a proposed reorganization on the grounds that the "plan is
not fair and equitable to all security holders. 1 30
The 1940 Act proceeds to give the SEC specific power to seek a
12115 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1970). The SEC from time to time has invoked this power
to require major revisions of rules of registered securities exchanges. Examples are
Rule 19b-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-2 (1974), which requires each member of a registered
exchange to engage principally in a public securities business, and Rule 19b-3, 17
C.F.R. § 240.19b-3 (1974), which orders exchanges to eliminate their fixed commission
structure. Rtule 19b-2 has been partially suspended since March 1973. See 39 Fed. Reg.
27909. Rule 19b-3 is effective on May 1, 1975.
'215 U.S.C. § 80a-1, et seq. (1970).
'215 U.S.C. § 80a-9(a) (1970).
11415 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (1970).
"215 U.S.C. § 80a-10(b) (1970).
12115 U.S.C. § 80a-10(c) (1970).
'p15 U.S.C. § 80a-25 (1970).
mI5 U.S.C. § 80a-25(b) (1970).
1"15 U.S.C.§ 80a-25(c) (1970).
'13 Id.
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receiver of investment companies which are required to register under
the 1940 Act but have failed to do so. Section 41(e)"' of the 1940 Act
authorizes the court to "take exclusive jurisdiction and possession of
the investment company or companies involved and the books, re-
cords, and assets thereof. . .; and. . . to appoint a trustee, who with
the approval of the court, shall have the power to dispose of any and
all of such assets .... .,,12 This section is especially worth noting, for
it is the only provision in either the 1933, 1934 or 1940 Acts which
specifically authorizes the SEC to seek the appointment of a receiver.
But, even under § 41(e), the power to seek a receiver is specifically
limited to instances involving failure to register as an investment
company and cannot be sought as a remedy for other violations. The
existence of such a specific, yet limited, power in the receivership
area must engender some question as to the SEC's statutory powers
under the 1933 and 1934 Acts.
A final contrasting example of specific substantive powers of the
SEC over the internal workings of corporations is found in Chapter
X of the Bankruptcy Act.13 Under Chapter X the SEC is empowered
to act as an adviser to federal courts supervising reorganizations in
bankruptcy of publicly-owned companies with 300 or more stockhold-
ers and $3,000,000 or more in debts. The SEC is authorized to partici-
pate in such reorganization proceedings by submitting reports upon
the fairness and feasibility of proposed plans of reorganization. Since
the SEC can recommend, e.g., whether certain classes of stockholders
are being treated fairly, Chapter X thus provides another example of
specific statutory powers of the SEC relating to the internal affairs
of corporations. Even so, in a Chapter X proceeding, the court is not
bound by the SEC's conclusions and the Commission's role is strictly
advisory.
Having focused briefly upon some of the broad powers which cer-
tain statutory provisions expressly confer upon the SEC, several basic
questions must again be posited as a result of the remedies developed
in the recent cases brought under the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act:
What factors prompt the SEC to seek ancillary relief and what deter-
mines the form of relief sought; is ancillary relief of the nature and
extent discussed herein consistent with the disclosure philosophy of
the '33 and '34 Acts; and should the SEC be so involved in the
internal affairs of corporations, law firms, and accounting firms with-
out specific statutory authorization?
"'315 U.S.C. § 80a-41(e) (1970).
32Md.
3311 U.S.C. § 501, et seq. (1970).
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From a realistic standpoint, ancillary relief may be highly effec-
tive in assuring future compliance with the federal securities laws,
but that rationale alone seems a weak justification for the exercise of
potentially unlimited authority in fashioning ancillary relief. After
all, total banishment from the corporate world of any person found
in violation of any provision of the federal securities laws would be
one way effectively to assure future compliance, but it is unlikely that
anyone would seriously contend that such a remedy is within the
SEC's enforcement powers.
The answer to the dilemma which these developments create -
i.e., achieving a balance between effective and innovative enforce-
ment of the federal securities laws while not exceeding the statutory
powers granted by Congress - requires careful and constant atten-
tion. The achievement of such a balance is a desirable and necessary
objective, and whether the SEC achieves this balance requires a dis-
passionate analysis on a case by case basis.
Excessive restrictions upon the Commission's enforcement powers
are not desirable. On the other hand, since neither statutes nor pub-
lished rules or regulations of the SEC clarify the authority and proce-
dures of the Commission in this sensitive area, there is no published,
objective standard which assures an alleged violator that he is being
treated on the same basis as other violators. The absence of clarifica-
tion of the SEC's powers could ultimately lead to charges that decrees
involving ancillary relief are overly harsh, punitive in nature, and the
result of oppressive bargaining procedures used to compel settlement
of enforcement cases by consent. Conceivably, alleged violators could
also charge a denial of equal protection of the law.
Administrative agencies historically have been reluctant to pub-
lish objective rules in many areas, generally arguing that objective
rules merely result in loopholes for violators. This argument is valid
in some circumstances, but clarifictlon of the SEC's powers in the
area of ancillary relief by way of sfatute or rule is highly desirable.
Otherwise, public confidence in the fairness of the SEC's enforcement
process may ultimately be undermined.
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